

EDITORIAL

Dear Readers,

Due to their growing global significance, public attention has increasingly focused on maritime terrorism and piracy in particular. 2011 the number of worldwide pirate attacks only grew slowly. Nevertheless the medial and political pressure rise in Germany. Although attacks against ships under German flag were really seldom in 2011, German ship-owners and the media urged the politicians to license the passage of private security services on board of ships under German flag. The joint project PiraT addresses this issue. During the past 21 months, the partners of the joint project have analysed different aspects of the objective insecurity-situation and subjective insecurity-perceptions in connection with maritime security.

In particular, the multi-disciplinarity of the project consortium permits a comprehensive view on piracy and maritime terrorism. In this newsletter we present the outcome of a workshop with representatives of German ministries and two working papers about maritime terrorism.

Your suggestions and feedback are as always, most welcome.

PiraT-Workshop in November 2011

The workshop “**The containment of maritime power: Positions and objectives of German politics**” took place on 22th November 2011 at the Federal Academy for Security Policy in Berlin.

The aim of the workshop was to discuss the safety of trade routes and elaborate how the German Federal authorities are affected by maritime terrorism and piracy.

Additionally possible effects by the phenomenon of maritime power on German and European sea -commerce, economic relations and on social and political developments should be identified. These results were from interviews carried out by, the Federal Foreign Office, the Federal Ministry of the Interior, the Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development, the Federal Ministry of Defense and the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, during April-October 2011.

The non-existence of an **overall control** of securing the sea lines of communications against maritime power by just one ministry leads to a working together of the Federal Ministries on the basis of the specific ministerial responsibility. This leads in parts to a change of overall control in the treatment of the problematic, the reply to questions of the parties in the German Bundestag or the national representation in international bodies.

All ministries acknowledge the **importance of a security policy** concerning sea trade and communication routes. However, only the hot spot for piracy which is located along the Horn of Africa is classified as priority for German interests. On one hand the canalization of sea-commerce in the Gulf of Aden and the en-

trance to the Red Sea seems important; on the other hand Somalia as a failed state influences the security of international shipping. All ministries have made clear that the only way to change the security situation along the Horn of Africa is by fighting piracy on dry land. It is vital to expose the structures of national and international actors and to identify and combat their accomplices.

All ministries agree that the **economical damage** caused by piracy is severe. Unfortunately none of the ministries were able to show any concrete figures. In answering questions about piracy from the Social Democratic Party in the German Bundestag the Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development declared “that the German Government has no own knowledge about the costs caused by piracy.”

Ministries know that the motivating force for national action is from **media and public pressure**. Therefore after lengthy discussions, the conclusion is that neither the Federal Ministry of Interior nor the Federal Ministry of Defense has enough police or military forces to combat piracy. However the government’s position changed in favor of contracting private security companies on board ships using a German flag.

Maritime terrorism as one phenomenon of maritime power plays only a very limited role in the ministerial discussions. On the one hand all ministries accept the assessments by the Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst) about possible risks of terrorism on the other hand only the Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development made some conclusions for fighting and defence against maritime attacks by terrorists in its responsibility for the protection of German coastal waters and harbors (protection of critical infrastructure).

Regarding **actions and measures** for combating piracy the Federal Ministry of Transport,

Building and Urban Development supports passive preventive measures like the arranging of threat protection plans for ships and keeping safety regulations on board. This ministry is responsible for the development of national and international best management practices (BMP) as well, German ship-owners are recommended to comply with their regulations. The Federal Ministry of Interior stipulates the levels of danger -SOLAS and the designated sea area, which then should apply.

In a follow-up discussion it was agreed that the inter-ministerial working group represents a suitable mean for the convergence of different views. However this tool is not suited for accelerating political decisions. For example Secretaries of State from the Federal Ministries of Interior, Economics and Technology, and of Transport, Building and Urban Development agreed to a state certification of private security companies. They hope that a policy would be implemented before the German Federal Parliament takes their summer break in 2012. The valid question really is how important is it for the state to support German shipping companies seeing also that they are employed by other European states over the last months.

Maritime Terrorism: perpetrator groups and attack scenarios

An empirical-analytical evaluation

– PiraT Working Paper No. 13 published –


Maritime Terrorism is a phenomenon of maritime violence just as piracy is. Although there have been few empirically validated cases so far, the high risk potential of maritime terrorism is imminently clear. Accordingly, understanding the true potential threat represented by maritime terrorism is important to maritime security governance.

Patricia Schneider explores in her paper that was published in December 2011 the nature

of the risk posed by maritime terrorism: Is maritime terrorism really relevant? What are the characteristics of the actors and attacks? Do defense measures reflect the empirical findings? Are they tailored to the characteristics, motives, methods and regional distribution of the terrorist groups?

The working paper on the phenomenon of maritime terrorism will show that its separation from the broader concept of terrorism is valuable to research, as is the division of the term into subcategories reflecting where such acts take place. These distinctions make further research into violence at sea possible and with it the evaluation of risks for trade at sea.

The heart the paper is the first presentation of an empirical evaluation of past attacks, including perpetrator group, frequency, regional distribution and the number of victims. It presents the PiraT databank of maritime terrorism, which uses data from multiple other databases, and summarizes a number of findings obtained from the evaluation of the former. However, the conclusions can be reached only on a conditional basis. Patricia Schneider then reviews past attacks and their methods to develop model scenarios, before reviewing international security governance efforts to counteract the threat.



Source: Patricia Schneider (2011)

The number of attacks in the maritime sector over the studied period collected herein is in the hundreds, but in comparison to the total number of terrorist incidents over the same

period it is relatively small. Despite strong variations in the number of attacks over time, their frequency and the number of victims have been rising. These numerical trends, combined with repeated threat and potential impact of an attack, should lead to heightened attention and stress the importance of governance. Nationalist-separatist and Islamic groups have initiated the most attacks to date; assaults by Islamic groups have created the most victims in recent years. The participation of different perpetrator groups makes a general overview of maritime terrorism as a whole impossible and multi-dimensional analysis essential.



USS Cole after Terror attack, Source: DoD photo (2000)


The typical scenarios as filtered out of the data were helpful in illustrating which methods of attack have been used previously in a maritime context. The work concludes that though around half of the widely discussed scenarios are not purely fictional, there is a divide between the incidents that have taken place and the potential threat scenarios being addressed internationally by maritime security governance measures. Given the potentially catastrophic effects of some of the latter forms of maritime terrorism, this focus does not necessarily represent the wrong approach, yet this mismatch is interesting. The paper concludes that current measures are not specific enough to be fully effective; further research needs to be done.

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Maritime Terrorism in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea – Case Study Yemen.

- PiraT Working Paper No. 14 published -

As a result of the suicide attacks carried out against the United States Navy destroyer *USS Cole* and the oil tanker *Limburg*, maritime terrorism has become a topic of wider public interest in the last decade. Both attacks highlighted the vulnerability of both military and economic actors in the maritime domain. This vulnerability is exacerbated by the key importance of areas, such as, the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, to global maritime trade. In addition to Somali pirates, al-Qaeda and its affiliates are also aware of this volatile situation. For them, maritime terrorism is of central strategic importance, especially in the areas off the Yemeni coast.



Located between crisis-ridden Somalia and the oil-producing states of the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen is of crucial geostrategic significance. However, the country is facing an alarming number of difficult challenges. The terrorist networks operating in the country use this overall instable situation both to create sanctuaries and to promote their goals and methods. This development increasingly threatens the neighboring countries and the economic and security interests of the international community in the region.

This study written by Fabian Kümmeler provides a detailed description and analysis of maritime terrorism in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea, the related situation in Yemen and the maritime terrorist actors operating (from) there. The focus of this study therefore is two-fold. Firstly, it concentrates on creating and analyzing an empirical inventory of major cases of maritime terrorism in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. The in-depth analysis offers a detailed picture of this multi-faceted phenomenon. Secondly, it investigates the country's critical security situation, caused by its structural problems in political, economic and social fields. Although one can hardly predict what course political developments will take in the future, it is likely that the economic situation will worsen. This study also focuses on the motives, capabilities and the room for manoeuvre of the two maritime terrorist actors active in Yemen: the *Aden Abyan Islamic Army* and *Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula*.

The aim of this qualitative case study is to give an assessment of the recent situation in Yemen and its impact on the potential risk of maritime terrorism in the area, as well as to develop recommendations for action to stabilize maritime security in the region.

Activities/ Presentations/ Conferences

IFSH

Patricia Schneider participated as discussant in the „Maritime Expert Seminar“. The seminar took place in Helsinki, Finland, 12-15 December 2011. The framework was the Multinational Experiment 7, Access to the Global commons“ on invitation of German, American and Finnish Armed Forces. The goal was to discuss und further develop the „Maritime Security Regime Concept: Supporting Partnerships to Ensure Access in the Maritime Domain“.

Patricia Schneider presented the IFSH to an American student group from the Lüneburg Program of the University Studies Abroad

Consortium. The visit took place on the 8th of November 2011 within the framework of a seminar conducted by Sybille Reinke de Bui-

trago "International Affairs since 1945". Mrs. Schneider introduced the work of the IFSH and gave a presentation on maritime security.

Notification: PiraT-concluding conference!

The PiraT-concluding conference will take place on **18th** and **19th June 2012**. The scientific project partners will present their results and put these outcomes up for discussion.

Contact: Dr. Patricia Schneider, schneider@ifsh.de.

New Publications (Selection)

New Working Papers, downloads:

<http://www.maritimesecurity.eu/en/publikationen/workingpapers.html>

Schneider, Patricia (2011): **Maritimer Terrorismus: Tätergruppen und Anschlagstypen – Eine empirisch-analytische Bestandsaufnahme**. PiraT Working paper for Maritime Security No. 13, Hamburg.

Kümmeler, Fabian (2011): **Maritimer Terrorismus im Golf von Aden und im Roten Meer – Fallstudie Jemen**. PiraT Working paper for Maritime Security No. 14, Hamburg.

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